Contracting on litigation by Spier, Kathryn E. & Prescott, J.J.
A
u
th
or
M
an
u
sc
ri
p
t
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Contracting on Litigation∗
Kathryn E. Spier† and JJ Prescott‡
December 4, 2018
Abstract
Two risk-averse litigants with different subjective beliefs negotiate in the
shadow of a pending trial. Through contingent contracts, the litigants
can mitigate risk and/or speculate on the trial outcome. Contingent con-
tracting decreases the settlement rate and increases the volume and costs
of litigation. These contingent contracts mimic the services provided by
third-party investors, including litigation funders and insurance compa-
nies. The litigants (weakly) prefer to contract with risk-neutral third par-
ties when the capital market is transaction-cost free. However, contracting
with third parties further decreases the settlement rate, increases the costs
of litigation, and may increase the aggregate cost of risk bearing.
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1 Introduction
 This article studies contingent settlement contracts in litigation, exploring
both the deals that are struck between the litigating parties themselves and their
agreements with outside investors. Traditionally, scholars have viewed settlement
as a simple transfer payment from a defendant to a plaintiff in exchange for the
plaintiff abandoning a claim.1 But in reality, parties can and often do write de-
tailed contracts before trial that turn on the future trial outcome. We explicitly
account for this by allowing litigating parties to write general contracts with each
other that are contingent on the outcome of litigation. Then, placing lawsuits
into a market context, we compare these “inside” contracts to the “outside” con-
tracts offered by competitive third-party investors. Although inside and outside
contracts create value in similar ways, we show that contingent contracts between
the litigants themselves may lead to relatively fewer trials, less wasteful litigation
spending, and less aggregate risk.
Contingent settlement contracts appear in many different legal contexts and
take a variety of forms. Consider the following examples: In an automobile lia-
bility case, a $125,000 jury award was reduced to just under $94,000 because the
parties agreed in advance to a 75%/25% split of any court-awarded damages.2 In
a high-stakes medical malpractice case, a $30 million jury award was reduced to
$5.3 million pursuant to a “high-low” contract signed by the parties before trial.3
In yet another lawsuit, the parties agreed to a damages payment of $6,000 if the
jury found the defendant to be less than 50% at fault, $11,250 if she were found
to be exactly 50% at fault, and $22,500 if she were more than 51% at fault.4 Con-
tingent contracts with third-party financial service providers, including insurance
companies and litigation funders, have become increasingly common as well.
This article explores the positive and normative implications of contingent
settlement agreements in a model with two risk-averse parties, a plaintiff and a
defendant. At trial, the factfinder (who may be a judge, a jury, or an arbitrator)
will award damages. Trials are costly and risky, and the parties have potentially
different subjective beliefs about the likely outcome. The parties’ subjective be-
liefs, preferences, and litigation costs are assumed to be common knowledge, so
negotiations take place under complete information. The parties may decide to
1Surveys include Spier (2007) and Daughety and Reinganum (2012).
2Palimere v. Supermarkets Gen., No. 05186, 1989 WL 395822 (Pa. Com. Pl. Dec. 1989)
(Verdict and Settlement Summary).
3Andersen (2013). With a high-low agreement, the “defendant agrees to pay the plaintiff
a minimum recovery in return for the plaintiff’s agreement to accept a maximum amount
regardless of the outcome of trial” (Garner, 2004).
4Claudia Clemente v. Lisa Duran, 2006 WL 4643243 (N.J.Super.L.) (Verdict and Settlement
Summary).
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completely settle out of court, thereby ending the dispute and avoiding the risks
and costs of trial. Through a simple out-of-court settlement, the defendant is
effectively purchasing 100% of the plaintiff’s risky legal claim. Alternatively, the
parties may “agree to disagree” and bring the dispute to trial. In this environ-
ment, the litigating parties may enter into contingent agreements with each other
and/or with outside investors.
First, ignoring the external capital market, we show that the parties will write
an inside contract that specifies a lump-sum payment and a contingent payment
that is monotonic in the likelihood ratio of their subjective beliefs. If the parties
have CARA expected utility and their beliefs are normally distributed with di-
vergent means, then the defendant pays the plaintiff a guaranteed lump sum and
a fixed proportion of the court-determined damages. These contingent settlement
contracts bear a striking resemblance to the financial contracts traditionally of-
fered by third-party investors. Through the contingent settlement contract, the
defendant is in effect buying a partial equity stake in the plaintiff’s claim. Simi-
larly, through the contract, the plaintiff is effectively selling an insurance policy
to the defendant.
Finally, we allow the litigating parties to write contingent contracts with out-
side investors. These investors are risk neutral, share common beliefs, and oper-
ate in a competitive environment. In these idealized circumstances, the litigating
parties jointly prefer to write financial contracts with third-party investors rather
than with each other (although this preference is weak). Because the parties
perceive themselves to be better off with the backing of outside investors, some
cases that would otherwise have settled will go to trial instead. Thus, with out-
side investors, the settlement rate falls and the litigation rate rises. Interestingly,
we show that the optimal contracts with outside investors may actually expose
the litigating parties to more risk rather than less. Insofar as these contracts
increase both the costs and aggregate risks of litigation, third-party involvement
in litigation reduces social welfare.
 Litigation Literature. This article takes the literature on the economics of
litigation in a new direction. Many scholars have argued that settlement negotia-
tions may fail when the parties have divergent beliefs or non-common priors about
what will happen at trial (Landes, 1971; Posner, 1973; Gould, 1973; Shavell, 1982;
Bar-Gill, 2006).5 In these models, as here, the litigants are stubborn, and do not
update their beliefs when confronted with the differing opinions of others.6 Other
5Such models have been used in empirical work on litigation (Waldfogel, 1995) and employed
to explore fee-shifting (Shavell, 1982), case selection (Priest and Klein, 1984), bifurcation (Lan-
des, 1993), and tort reform (Babcock and Pogarsky, 1999; Landeo et al., 2013).
6Other articles explore learning in conjunction with optimism (Yildiz, 2004; Watanabe, 2005;
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scholars have explored bargaining failures in settings where the parties are asym-
metrically informed about what will happen at trial (Bebchuk, 1984; Reinganum
and Wilde, 1986; Spier, 1992).7 With a few notable exceptions discussed below,
the literature has not considered the possibility of contingent settlement contracts
in litigation. This is a significant oversight, as contingent settlement contracts
are both implied by theory and used in practice.
Prescott and Spier (2016) document a broad range of contingent settlement
contracts, including agreements that specify shares of liability and litigate dam-
ages only, and agreements to modify or place bounds on damages payments.8 In
a sample of more than 2,700 cases from New York State’s summary jury trial
program, Prescott and Spier (2016) show that approximately eighty percent had
high-low agreements (a particular type of contingent settlement contract).9 Using
insurance claims data from a large national insurance company, Prescott et al.
(2014) show that contested insurance claims with above-median risk were four to
five times more likely to use high-low agreements than claims with below-median
risk. This latter article also illustrates the value of these agreements in a simple
binary model with two possible trial outcomes. The current article crowns our
prior work by considering general distributions of trial outcomes, general contin-
gent settlement contracts, and the role of third-party investors.10
The last several years have seen the growth of companies that specialize in
investing in lawsuits (Garber, 2010; Steinitz, 2012). In a model with asymmet-
ric information and risk-neutral parties, Daughety and Reinganum (2014) argue
that third-party litigation funding can mitigate asymmetric information prob-
lems, thereby reducing bargaining failures and increasing the settlement rate.11
By contrast, we find that bargaining failures are more common and settlement
less likely with third-party litigation funding. In our model, risk-averse litigants
benefit from shifting risk and speculating through outside investors, which in turn
makes trial more likely.12 The literature on liability insurance focuses on policies
Yildiz and Vasserman, 2016).
7The plaintiff may have better information about the magnitude of the harm they have
suffered whereas the defendant may know more about who is liable. In Farmer and Pecorino
(1994) and Heyes et al. (2004), parties privately observe their risk preferences.
8Examples include 90%/10%, 80%/20%, 70%/30% and 50%/50% splits (among others). See
Prescott and Spier (2016).
9High-low contracts are featured in several state-sponsored alternative dispute resolution
programs (Hannaford-Agor, 2012).
10Lavie and Tabbach (2017) build on Prescott and Spier (2016) by exploring contingent con-
tracting in a model with one-sided private information. Spier (1994) analyzes direct-revelation
mechanisms with two-sided private information. These approaches are complementary to ours.
11Avraham and Wickelgren (2014) argue that the terms of a litigation funding contract may
signal the plaintiff’s private information to the court. They do not consider settlement.
12Contingent fees with lawyers may also more efficiently allocate risk (Danzon, 1983) and
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acquired before an accident arises,13 although the possibility of after-the-event
insurance has also been explored (Molot, 2009). These articles do not explore the
role of divergent prior beliefs or the implications for aggregate risk bearing.
 Divergent Prior Beliefs. Our article is part of a broader theoretical lit-
erature on contracting with non-common prior beliefs. See Morris (1995) and
Ko¨szegi (2014). There are a number of recent articles in the financial economics
literature that are related to ours. Weyl (2007) and Dieckmann (2011) show that
insurance markets for rare events can increase aggregate risk when parties have
divergent beliefs. Simsek (2013) shows that new financial products will cause
traders to increase their bets on existing financial assets, thus amplifying portfo-
lio risk. Our result that contingent settlement contracts with outside litigation
funders and suppliers of capital may increase aggregate risk is in the same spirit.
There are different ways that one can evaluate welfare in models with divergent
prior beliefs. First, one might simply consider the subjective well-being of the
litigants themselves. With this approach, if the parties perceive themselves to
be jointly better off going to trial, then one would say that welfare is higher.
Second, one might instead evaluate the well-being of the litigants using a single,
objective truth (as in Weyl, 2007; Sandroni and Squintani, 2007; Brunnermeier et
al., 2014). This second approach explicitly recognizes that with divergent beliefs,
not everyone can be correct.14 We present both approaches. First, we analyze the
effects of inside and outside contracts on the subjective well-being of the litigants,
using their divergent beliefs. Next, we analyze these effects using a single set of
objective, true beliefs. For the latter, we follow Brunnermeier et al. (2014) and
assume that the objective truth is any convex combination of the beliefs of the
parties themselves. Our results do not depend on the particular weights applied.15
So although it might be natural to assume that the capital market has unbiased
beliefs, this is not required for our results.
Our assumption that parties hold different subjective beliefs is empirically
relevant. Indeed, according to DeBondt and Thaler (1995), “perhaps the most
robust finding in the psychology of judgment is that people are overconfident.”
In a controlled laboratory setting where subjects were randomly assigned to the
roles of plaintiff or defendant, Loewenstein et al. (1993) find strong evidence
of self-serving assessments that were correlated with settlement breakdowns and
overcome agency problems (Rubinfeld and Scotchmer, 1993; Dana and Spier, 1993).
13In many cases, insurance companies act as proxies for defendants in litigation (Sebok, 2014).
14Note that if the parties themselves were choosing a social welfare function from behind a
veil of ignorance, before their beliefs are formed, then the parties would choose this second,
admittedly paternalistic, approach.
15In particular, the true beliefs may coincide with those of the outside investors.
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trial. Eigen and Listokin (2012) find evidence of optimism bias in a natural ex-
periment where subjects were randomly assigned sides in moot court cases. These
experimental findings are not consistent with asymmetric information. In a study
of practicing litigators, Goodman-Delahunty et al. (2010) find that lawyers with
more years of experience exhibit the very same overconfidence as their less expe-
rienced counterparts, and that overconfidence does not wane as the time to trial
becomes shorter.16 In practice, divergent beliefs appear to be both commonplace
and persistent.
Our analysis delivers several empirical predictions. First, contingent contracts
will tend to be flatter (less sensitive to the trial outcome) when the risk of trial is
larger, when the parties are more averse to risk, and when the parties have more
aligned beliefs. Second, our model predicts that contracting on litigation between
the litigants themselves may be more common in cases when the market for third-
party funding is limited by transactions costs or law.17 Indeed, restrictions on
litigation funding vary by jurisdiction, with participants variously being subject
to usury laws, champerty restrictions, and rules of professional responsibility and
ethical guidelines.18 Finally, when the market for third-party funding is limited,
fewer lawsuits will go to trial and, for those that do go to trial, the aggregate risk
borne by the participants may be lower.
The outline of the article is as follows. The next section presents the basic
model and solves for the equilibrium outcomes of the three regimes: naked trials,
inside contracts, and outside contracts. For each regime, we evaluate the parties’
decision to settle versus litigate, the risks and the costs of litigation. Section 3
presents the social welfare analysis, analyzing the private subjective benefits of
litigation and the social costs of litigation across the three contractual regimes.
Section 4 offers concluding remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
 Suppose that there are two parties to a dispute, a plaintiff (p) and a defendant
(d), who are negotiating prior to a trial. If the case goes to trial, the court will
16Relatedly, Wistrich and Rachlinski (2013) present evidence that lawyers and judges are
susceptible to confirmation bias.
17This may be consistent with the observed popularity of partial settlement contracts in the
small stakes cases in Prescott and Spier (2016). Note, however, that there may be fewer lawsuits
in jurisdictions where litigation funding is prohibited.
18See Steinitz (2012). In practice, litigation funders may exert various types and degrees of
control through staged financing, duties to cooperate, and other mechanisms. Insurers may
acquire control through assignment or subrogation (Sebok, 2014).
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order a transfer of x from the defendant to the plaintiff and the parties will bear
litigation costs cd and cp. The parties have CARA expected utility functions,
ui(z) = − exp(−aiz) where ai > 0, i = p, d, are the coefficients of absolute risk
aversion for the parties.19 The parties to the dispute may choose to negotiate
a full settlement before trial, where the defendant pays a fixed amount and the
plaintiff withdraws the complaint. A full settlement completely ends the dispute,
avoiding the risks and the costs of litigation. We assume that the plaintiff has a
credible threat to litigate.20
The litigants have potentially different subjective beliefs about the probability
distribution of the court’s award, fi(x), i = p, d. Unless specified otherwise, we
assume that these beliefs are normally distributed with means µp and µd, respec-
tively, and common variance σ2.21 Later, we will introduce a competitive capital
market with risk-neutral investors who share the common belief that the court
award x is distributed with mean µ0 and variance σ
2. We assume the distribu-
tions, litigation costs, and risk aversion coefficients are all common knowledge so
there is no learning over time.22
We analyze three different contractual settings. First, as a benchmark, we
consider “naked trials” where the parties cannot write contingent contracts with
each other or with third parties. At the conclusion of trial, x is transferred
from the defendant to the plaintiff. Second, we consider litigation with “inside
contracts,” where the parties can agree before trial to modify the court’s award so
that s(x) is transferred instead of x.23 Third, we consider litigation with “outside
contracts,” where each party can write contingent contracts with investors from
the external capital market. So, for example, the plaintiff might agree to sell
shares of any award received in the case to outside investors, and the defendant
might agree to purchase an insurance policy.
For each setting, we characterize the set of subjective Pareto-optimal con-
19Large corporate defendants, or defendants who have been replaced by diversified insurance
companies, may be less risk averse than small plaintiffs. Note, however, that corporations are
managed by risk-averse agents who are concerned about career prospects and performance pay.
20If the plaintiff did not have a credible threat to litigate, the defendant would refuse to
negotiate and the case would be dropped. Contracting with third parties may strengthen the
plaintiff’s bargaining position. We will discuss this possibility below.
21Technically, with these densities, the court award could be negative. Because the slope of
the optimal contract in (5) depends on the natural logarithm of the ratio of the densities, our
results would hold if we truncated the densities at zero.
22The beliefs of the litigants and the capital market are modeled as primitives. Alternatively,
beliefs could be modeled as randomly drawn signals. Our parties are decidedly not Bayesian –
they do not revise their own beliefs as they learn about the signals of others.
23Equivalently, the contract could specify side payments, τ(x), from the plaintiff to the de-
fendant after the payment of the damage award x. Specifically, τ(x) = x− s(x) would require
the plaintiff to return the damage award x to the defendant but keep an amount s(x).
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tracts. That is, given the parties’ divergent subjective beliefs, we describe the set
of contracts where it is impossible to make one party subjectively better off with-
out making the other party subjectively worse off. In designing their contracts,
the parties trade off their desire to hedge risk and their desire to speculate and
gamble on the trial. Our concept of Pareto optimality shows the utmost respect
for the divergent subjective beliefs of the parties. For each setting, we quantify
the joint subjective value the parties derive from going to trial and the level of
risk that they jointly bear, and characterize the parties’ decision to fully settle
out of court or go to trial. We adopt the generalized Nash bargaining solution
where the defendant captures share pi ∈ [0, 1] and the plaintiff captures share
1− pi of any bargaining surplus.24
We also evaluate welfare in the three contractual settings using a single, ob-
jective assessment of the truth. With this approach, the subjective value that
the litigants think that they are getting from the trial does not reflect a legiti-
mate social benefit. Following Brunnermeier et al. (2014), we assume that the
true distribution of the court award is a convex combination of the parties’ be-
liefs.25 Specifically, we assume that the truth is normally distributed with mean
µt and variance σ
2. The “truth” µt may coincide with the beliefs of the plaintiff
(µt = µp), the beliefs of the defendant (µt = µd), or the beliefs of the capital
market (µt = µ0), or it could differ from all three.
As we will see, our results regarding the aggregate risks from inside and out-
side contracts do not depend on the precise value of µt. Our welfare results
hold regardless of whose beliefs are correct. To be sure, it is natural to imagine
that corporate defendants, big insurance companies, and Wall Street financiers,
are more sophisticated and less subject to optimism and self-serving biases than
small plaintiffs. After all, large commercial litigation investors are repeat players.
In this case, it may well be the case that the outside investors have more accu-
rate beliefs than the litigants themselves. But our model’s implications for the
subjective benefits of private contracting and the aggregate level of risk bearing
would be valid even if this were not true.
 Naked Trials. Suppose that the parties choose between a full settlement
and a naked trial. With our assumptions on preferences and normally-distributed
beliefs, the least the plaintiff would be willing to accept in settlement is s =
µp − apσ2/2 − cp.26 This is the plaintiff’s expected value of the court award,
24This is equivalent to a random-offeror model where the defendant makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer with probability pi.
25Brunnermeier et al. (2014) define the set of “reasonable beliefs” to be the set of convex
combinations of the beliefs of the parties themselves.
26This is a standard implication of the CARA-normal framework and will not be reproduced
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evaluated at the plaintiff’s subjective belief, minus the risk premium and litigation
cost. Similarly, the most the defendant would be willing to pay in settlement is
s = µd + adσ
2/2 + cd. If s ≤ s the parties will agree to settle out of court for
some amount s ∈ [s, s], avoiding the costs of trial. The parties will go to trial if
s > s, or
cp + cd < B
N(µp, µd, ap, ad, σ
2) = (µp − µd)− (ap + ad)σ2/2. (1)
The left-hand side of this expression is the joint cost of trial. The right-hand
side, BN(), is the joint benefit of trial, as perceived by the parties. The first
term is their joint benefit of speculation, and the second term is the sum of their
risk premiums. If the parties had the same beliefs or were mutually pessimistic,
µp−µd ≤ 0, then BN() is negative and the case would surely settle.27 But if the
parties are sufficiently optimistic, so µp − µd is positive and large, then the case
will go to trial.
Although the parties may find trial mutually attractive based on their subjec-
tive beliefs, trials are wasteful from a social welfare perspective. When evaluated
using the “true” objective beliefs, µt, the plaintiff’s certainty equivalent of a trial
is µt − apσ2/2− cp, and the defendant’s certainty equivalent is µt + adσ2/2 + cd.
Subtracting these expressions, the net social value of a naked trial is negative and
equal to −(ap + ad)σ2/2 − (cp + cd). Letting RN() denote the sum of the risk
premiums,
RN(ap, ad, σ
2) = (ap + ad)σ
2/2, (2)
and the social value of a naked trial is
SN(ap, ad, σ
2) = −RN(ap, ad, σ2)− (cp + cd). (3)
Trials are socially wasteful because they impose both risks and costs on the par-
ties.28 Note that in our benchmark case, social welfare does not depend on the
parties’ subjective beliefs µp and µd. Later, when financial contracts are intro-
duced, social welfare will depend on these parameters indirectly (as the parties’
beliefs influence their choice of contract).
 Inside Contracts. We now allow the two parties to the dispute (the insid-
ers) to contract with each other before trial, but we do not allow them to write
contracts with third parties. Under the terms of the contract s(x), the defendant
here. See, for example, Grossman (1976).
27With generalized Nash bargaining the case would settle for pis+ (1− pi)s.
28Using equations (1), (2), and (3), the litigants’ joint subjective value of a naked trial is
BN () − (cp + cd) = (µp − µd) − (ap + ad)σ2/2 − (cp + cd) = (µp − µd) + SN (ap, ad, σ2). If
µp > µd, the litigants’ joint subjective value is clearly larger than the social value.
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will pay s(x) to the plaintiff. This contract overrides any court award, x. Using
the parties’ subjective beliefs, Pareto optimality requires that s(x) maximize a
weighted sum of the parties’ expected utilities:
β
∫
up(s(x)− cp)fp(x)dx+ (1− β)
∫
ud(−s(x)− cd)fd(x)dx
where β ∈ (0, 1) and (1− β) are arbitrary weights.29 Maximizing this expression
pointwise, we have s(x) implicitly solves βu′p(s(x)− cp)fp(x)− (1− β)u′d(s(x)−
cd)fd(x) = 0 for all x, so s(x) satisfies
fp(x)
fd(x)
u′p(s(x)− cp)
u′d(−s(x)− cd)
=
1− β
β
. (4)
With CARA expected utility, any equilibrium contract will take the form:
s(x) = k +
(
1
ap + ad
)
ln
(
fp(x)
fd(x)
)
(5)
where k is a constant.30
This expression describes the locus of contracts for which there is no alter-
native contract that makes both parties subjectively better off. The contracts in
this locus differ from each other only in the fixed payment, k, a value that will be
determined by negotiations between the parties.31 The shape of the contract de-
pends on the parties’ subjective beliefs about the distribution of the court award,
x, and the sum of their risk aversion coefficients, ap+ad. Specifically, the contract
s(x) hinges on the likelihood ratio, fp(x)/fd(x). If the plaintiff believes that the
outcome x is (relatively) more likely than the defendant does, so fp(x)/fd(x) is
larger, then the contract will stipulate a higher payment for that particular real-
ization of x. Conversely, if the plaintiff believes that an outcome is less likely than
the defendant does, so the ratio fp(x)/fd(x) is smaller, then the contract s(x) will
specify a smaller amount. Note that if the distributions exhibit the monotone
likelihood ratio property, so higher realizations of x are more consistent with the
plaintiff’s subjective beliefs than with the defendant’s, then the contract s(x) will
be monotonically increasing in the court’s award x.32
29Suppose that the plaintiff (for example) were choosing the contract s(x) to maximize his
or her own expected utility subject to the defendant’s individual rationality constraint. The
resulting Lagrangian would have this form.
30See Appendix for a proof.
31The plaintiff will prefer a higher fixed payment, and the defendant will prefer a lower one.
The constant could be negative, in which case the plaintiff pays the defendant. The relative
bargaining strengths of the parties affect the fixed payment, not the variable component.
32This situation corresponds to the mutual optimism of the two parties.
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With normally-distributed beliefs, the equilibrium inside contract s(x) is lin-
ear in the court’s award, x, and satisfies
s(x) = s0 + s1x where s1 =
µp − µd
(ap + ad)σ2
(6)
and s0 is a negotiated constant which depends on the bargaining power of the
two parties.33 (See Appendix for a proof.)
When µp > µd, so the plaintiff believes that the average court award is higher
than the defendant does, then the slope of s(x) is positive. When the parties are
sufficiently risk averse, the slope of the contract is smaller than one, so the sub-
jectively optimal contract imposes less risk on the parties than a naked trial does.
When the parties are not too risk averse and/or are sufficiently optimistic about
their own cases, the contract will have a slope that is greater than one.34 Rather
than seeking to mitigate the risk at trial, the parties may find it in their mutual
interest to amplify that risk and gamble on the court’s award.35 Amplification
also occurs when the variance σ2 is sufficiently small, so the parties have precise
(albeit heterogeneous) beliefs.
When µp < µd, the parties are pessimistic relative to each other and the
equilibrium contract has a negative slope. That is, the plaintiff receives less when
the court’s award is high than when it is low. Although the possibility of a
negative slope is interesting in theory, it may not be advisable in practice as a
contract with a negative slope would give the parties an incentive to sabotage
their own cases.36 In reality, parties can control the presentation of evidence
at trial, and can thus affect the level of damages awarded by the court, factors
that are not included the model. So, unless the parties can commit themselves
to putting their best cases forward, contracts along these lines would at best be
rare.
We now consider the parties’ decision to settle out of court or go to trial.
To construct the bargaining range, we make use of the following property: If a
random variable x is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ2, then
the random variable y = γ0 + γ1x, where γ0 and γ1 are constants, is normally
33With more general beliefs, the inside contract would not be linear. If the litigants’ beliefs
have divergent variances, too, then the optimal inside contract would be quadratic. As discussed
later, one can also construct beliefs where the optimal inside contract is a high-low agreement.
34In this case, the corresponding transfer would be negative. So rather than the defendant
making a lump-sum payment to the plaintiff, the plaintiff would make a lump-sum payment to
the defendant for the opportunity to receive the augmented damages.
35Contracts that shift litigation costs from the winner to the loser amplify the risk of trial.
Fee shifting is common in commercial contracts, although after-the-event fee-shifting is rare.
See Donohue (1991).
36This is analogous to an athlete betting against their own team and then throwing the game.
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distributed with mean µy = γ0+γ1µ and variance σ
2
y = γ
2
1σ
2. Using this property,
the least that the plaintiff is willing to accept in settlement to avoid a trial is
s = s0 + s1µp− aps21σ2/2− cp. Similarly, the most the defendant is willing to pay
to avoid a trial is s = s0 + s1µd + ads
2
1σ
2/2 + cd. Taken together, the parties will
settle when s ≤ s and will go to trial if and only if s > s or, equivalently,
cp + cd < s1(µp − µd)− (ap + ad)s21σ2/2. (7)
The first term on the right-hand side, s1(µp−µd), is the parties’ joint subjective
benefit from speculation. Because the slope s1 has the same sign as µp − µd, the
joint value of speculation is necessarily positive. The second term is the sum of
the two parties’ risk premiums. Importantly, the cost of risk may be higher or
lower than the risk of a naked trial. When s21 < 1 the parties are mitigating the
risk through their contract, and when s21 > 1 they are amplifying it.
37 Using the
equilibrium contract defined in (6), the parties will go to trial instead of settling
if and only if
cp + cd < B
∗(µp, µd, ap, ad, σ
2) =
(µp − µd)2
2(ap + ad)σ2
. (8)
The function B∗() is the joint subjective benefit of litigation with inside
contracting. Note that this expression is increasing in the square of the divergence
in the parties’ beliefs. When the parties disagree about the outcome at trial, they
can derive more joint value through speculative contracts. Also note that the joint
benefit increases without bound as the sum of their risk aversion parameters
approaches zero. Indeed, in the limit, B∗() approaches infinity. With divergent
beliefs and a high tolerance for risk, agents can design inside contracts to “pump”
considerable value out of their exchange.38
Letting R∗() denote the sum of the parties’ risk premiums with the equilib-
rium inside contract defined in (6), we have:39
R∗(µp, µd, ap, ad, σ
2) = (ap + ad)s
2
1σ
2/2 =
(µp − µd)2
2(ap + ad)σ2
. (9)
Note that R∗() depends on the parties’ subjective beliefs, µp and µd, but not on
the truth, µt. When the parties’ subjective beliefs are more divergent (i.e., µp
37The slope s1 maximizes the joint benefit and thus optimally trades off the parties’ need for
insurance and their desire to speculate.
38Using insurance claims data, Prescott et al. (2014) show that lawsuits with higher-than-
average risk are more likely to adopt high-low agreements. Consistent with this, an increase in
σ2 corresponds to a higher incremental value of contracting, B∗()−BN ().
39The quadratic structure implies R∗() = B∗().
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and µd are farther apart), the inside contract in (6) is steeper and so the sum of
the risk premiums in (9) is larger. When the parties become more risk averse,
so ap + ad rises, there are two offsetting effects. First, holding the slope of the
inside contract s1 fixed, the sum of the risk premiums increases. Second, the
inside contract in (6) becomes flatter, and so the sum of the risk premiums falls.
In equilibrium, this latter effect dominates.40
Evaluating the parties’ payoffs with a single set of true beliefs, the social value
of a trial with the inside contract is:
S∗(µp, µd, ap, ad, σ
2) = −R∗(µp, µd, ap, ad, σ2)− (cp + cd). (10)
 Outside Contracts. We now assume that the plaintiff and the defendant
may enter into bilateral contracts with third-party investors (instead of with
each other). As described earlier, we assume that the capital market has many
identical risk-neutral investors who share the belief that the outcome at trial is
normally distributed with mean µ0 and variance σ
2.41 These investors compete
with each other head-to-head for the opportunity to provide financial backing to
the plaintiff and the defendant. The competitive market price of the lawsuit is
µ0, and the investors break even in expectation.
42
One might imagine that our setting would give rise to a proverbial “money
pump” or “Dutch bookie” who could make unlimited profits by brokering trades
between the two parties.43 There are two reasons why this does not happen in
our setting. First, strict convexity of preferences (e.g., risk aversion) will limit
the gains that could be obtained by a bookie (Morris, 1995). This underscores
the importance of risk aversion for our analysis. Second, we assume that third-
party investors are competitive; any value created through a money pump would
be captured by the plaintiff and the defendant themselves rather than by the
bookie. As we discuss later, our core results are robust to alternative assumptions
regarding market power.
We let t(x) denote the contract between the plaintiff and the financial service
provider, who may be a litigation funder or other third party. With this contract,
40The cost of risk is discontinuous. If ap = ad = 0, then R
∗() = 0. If ap+ad → 0, the parties
engage in increasingly large bets and R∗()→∞. If there were exogenous limits on speculative
contracting, then R∗() would not diverge as ap + ad → 0.
41Although we place no restrictions on these beliefs, it may in fact be the case that investors
have unbiased beliefs, µ0 = µt, and that the plaintiff and the defendant are more optimistic
about their cases than the outside investors, µd ≤ µ0 ≤ µp.
42Since the outside investors share the same beliefs µ0 they do not want to speculate with
each other on the outcome of the litigation.
43For a discussion of the “money pump” in environments with non-common priors, see Bin-
more (1992) and Daughety and Reinganum (2012).
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the plaintiff receives t(x)−cp and the third party receives the residual amount x−
t(x). So, for example, if t(x) = 100+x/4, then the investor is paying the plaintiff
one hundred dollars for a seventy-five percent stake in the award. Similarly, we
let r(x) represent the contract between the defendant and the financial service
provider. With this contract, the defendant is responsible for paying r(x)+cd and
the third party pays the residual x−r(x). Although this framework assumes that
the plaintiff and the defendant are the ones to bear the litigation costs, cp and
cd, this assumption is without loss of generality. Note also that because r(x) and
t(x) need not equal each other, these third-party contracts allow the plaintiff and
the defendant to decouple their respective interests. Decoupling will allow the
parties to fine-tune their respective outside contracts to reflect their subjective
risk preferences and beliefs.
For concreteness, we assume the following timing. In the first stage, the two
parties have the opportunity to settle with each other. If their negotiations fail,
then in the second stage the parties turn to the outside capital market and buy
and/or sell claims on their respective positions. As in the previous section, we
characterize the (subjective) Pareto-optimal contracts between the parties and
their respective third-party investors. In the third stage, the court announces the
award, x, and all financial claims are settled.
With this timing, we are obviously – and very decidedly – abstracting away
from any conflicts of interest between the parties and their respective investors
over whether to settle the case, and from any possible commitment value of
third-party contracting.44 This particular timing is not critical for the results,
however. We could assume equivalently that the plaintiff and the defendant
can sign contracts with third parties prior to settlement negotiations, so long
as the parties and their backers can subsequently renegotiate their contracts if
settlement negotiations fail.45 So long as the parties and their respective investors
negotiate settlements that are in their mutual interest, and can negotiate deals on
the eve of trial that maximize their joint subjective value from trial, our results
will hold.
It is instructive to begin the analysis by developing some general insights.
Suppose the plaintiff can contract with a third-party investor who is risk averse
with CARA coefficient a0 > 0 and beliefs f0(x). Using the earlier methodology,
any equilibrium contract t(x) between the plaintiff and the third-party investor
44There is an active literature exploring how contracts with third parties can be a valuable
strategic commitment in litigation. Spier (2007) surveys this literature, which includes analyses
of contingent-fee lawyers, insurance companies, and debtholders.
45In practice, the plaintiff may receive payments from investors before trial. If the case settles,
the investor receives a share of the settlement. Note that agency problems could arise if the
interests of the plaintiff and the investor diverge. This does not happen in the current setting.
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will be of the form:
t(x) = t+
(
1
ap + a0
)
ln
(
fp(x)
f0(x)
)
+
(
a0
ap + a0
)
x (11)
where t is a lump-sum payment.
It is interesting to compare expression (11) to our earlier expression (5), which
characterized the equilibrium inside contract between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant. The two contracts are similar, but there is an additional risk-sharing term
in (11). Suppose that the third-party investor has the same beliefs and risk tol-
erance as the defendant, so f0(x) = fd(x) and a0 = ad, then the outside contract
in (11) would have a larger slope than the analogous inside contract in (5). Intu-
itively, reducing the slope of s(x) in (5) reduces the risk for both the plaintiff and
the defendant. In contrast, reducing the slope of t(x) in (11) shifts risk towards
the third-party investor. So, the outside contract t(x) would expose the plaintiff
to greater risk than the inside contract s(x).
Now suppose that the third-party investors have normally-distributed beliefs
with mean µ0 and variance σ
2 and are risk neutral (a0 = 0). The investors value
the lawsuit at its expected value, µ0. In the competitive equilibrium, the outside
investors compete to provide financial services to the plaintiff and defendant. The
competitive market price is µ0 and the investors break even in expectation.
As proven in the Appendix, the plaintiff’s equilibrium outside contract is
t(x) = t0 + t1x where t0 = (1− t1)µ0 and t1 =
µp − µ0
apσ2
. (12)
This equilibrium contract makes intuitive sense. Suppose that the plaintiff and
the third-party investors hold exactly the same beliefs, so µ0 = µp. In this case,
equation (12) tells us that t1 = 0. In other words, the risk-averse plaintiff sells
one hundred percent of the case to the risk-neutral investors for the competitive
market price, t0 = µ0. Suppose instead that µ0 < µp, so the third-party investors
think the case is weaker than the plaintiff believes it to be. Then, the plaintiff
chooses to keep fraction t1 > 0 of the case and sells the residual stake to the
investors for the competitive market price, t0 = (1− t1)µ0.46 Finally, comparing
(12) to the optimal inside contract in (6) reveals that if µ0 = µd < µp then t1 > s1.
If the capital market holds the same beliefs as the defendant, the optimal outside
contract exposes the plaintiff to more risk than the optimal inside contract.
The defendant’s equilibrium outside contract with their third-party backer
has a similar form:
r(x) = r0 + r1x where r0 = (1− r1)µ0 and r1 =
µ0 − µd
adσ2
. (13)
46If µp is much larger than µ0, or if the plaintiff is not very risk averse, then t1 > 1 and
t0 < 0.
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With this contract, the defendant is paying third-party investors a lump sum
r0 = (1 − r1)µ0 to accept responsibility for a fraction 1 − r1 of the court award.
Because the market price is µ0, the outside investors (just) break even on their
investments. Note that if µd = µ0, and so the defendant and the capital market
share the same beliefs, then r1 = 0 in equation (13). In other words, the defendant
would pay a price of r0 = µ0 to insure one hundred percent of the court award.
We now evaluate the decision of the parties to settle their case out of court.
If the parties’ settlement negotiations fail, they will enter into contracts with
third-party investors as outlined in (12) and (13) above and will go to trial.
Using our earlier methods, it is not hard to construct the bargaining range. The
plaintiff’s certainty equivalent of going to trial with the third-party contract t(x)
is s = (1 − t1)µ0 + t1µp − apt21σ2/2 − cp. Notice that this certainty equivalent
is subjective, and is evaluated according to the plaintiff’s subjective beliefs, µp.
This is the very least that the plaintiff would accept in settlement. Similarly, the
defendant’s (subjective) certainty equivalent is s = (1−r1)µ0+r1µd+adr21σ2/2+cd,
which is the most that the defendant would be willing to pay to settle the case
before trial. Combining these two expressions, s > s if and only if
cp + cd < (µp − µ0)t1 − apt21σ2/2 + (µ0 − µd)r1 − adr21σ2/2. (14)
Using the slopes t1 and r1 from (12) and (13) above, we conclude that the parties
will go to trial if and only if the costs of litigation are smaller than the parties’
joint subjective benefits from trial,
cp + cd < B
0(µ0, µp, µd, ap, ad, σ
2) =
(µp − µ0)2
2apσ2
+
(µ0 − µd)2
2adσ2
. (15)
Because the third-party investors are breaking even in expectation, the right-hand
side is also the joint subjective benefit of trial for all four parties.
It is straightforward to compute the aggregate cost of risk and social welfare.
Because the third-party investors are risk neutral, we need only consider the risk
premiums of the litigants,
R0(µ0, µp, µd, ap, ad, σ
2) = apt
2
1(σ
2/2) + adr
2
1(σ
2/2) =
(µp − µ0)2
2apσ2
+
(µ0 − µd)2
2adσ2
.
(16)
Evaluating the parties’ payoffs with a set of objective beliefs, the social value of
a trial with outside contracts is
S0(µ0, µp, µd, ap, ad, σ
2) = −R0(µ0, µp, µd, ap, ad, σ2)− (cp + cd). (17)
 Discussion. Our model has important implications in real-world settings,
and may be extended in a variety of ways.
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Coexistence of Inside and Outside Contracting. We have assumed that the lit-
igants either write inside contracts with each other or outside contracts with
third-party investors. We have not explored the possibility that the parties may
use both types of contracts, sharing risk with each other in addition to risk shar-
ing with the external capital market. In the Appendix, we state and prove that
if both the plaintiff and the defendant write the (subjectively) optimal contracts
with the third parties in (12) and (13), then there is no additional value to be
captured with inside contracts. Intuitively, gains from trade fail to exist because
the plaintiff and defendant have exactly the same opportunity cost of funds.47
The plaintiff would be delighted to sell some additional insurance to the defen-
dant if the defendant was willing to pay more than µ0 (which is the price paid by
the litigation funder). But the defendant has no interest in paying this inflated
price because he can already purchase as much insurance as he wants from the
capital market at price µ0.
Unequal Access to Capital. Our previous analysis assumed that the litigants had
equal access to the outside capital market. But in practice, litigation funding for
plaintiffs is more common than after-the-event insurance for defendants. Perhaps
surprisingly, the parties can and will obtain the very same joint benefits when only
the plaintiff can access the capital market as when they both can access it. To
see why this is true, note that the plaintiff and the defendant can write an inside
contract that mimics the optimal outside insurance policy in (13), r(x) = r0+r1x
where r0 = (1−r1)µ0. The plaintiff could then supplement this inside contract by
selling a fraction r1− t1 of the case to an outside litigation funder for the market
price (r1 − t1)µ0.48 Similarly, if only the defendant could access the market, the
defendant could purchase a stake in the plaintiff’s case with an inside contract
and acquire additional insurance (if necessary) from the capital market with an
outside contract. Thus, even when only one party can access to the capital
market, the parties can perfectly replicate r(x) = r0 + r1x and t(x) = t0 + t1x
just as before.49
Investor Market Power. Our qualitative results would continue to hold if the
third-party investors have market power. To see why, suppose that a third-party
47If investors are risk averse and cannot diversify, the litigants would share risk with each
other in addition to their respective funders. Cases with inside contracts often include insurance
companies/contingent-fee lawyers. See Prescott et al. (2014) and Prescott and Spier (2016).
48Equivalently, the plaintiff can be an insurance middleman, purchasing the policy r(x) =
r0 + r1x from the capital market and then reselling it to the defendant. The plaintiff would
then sell a fraction 1− t1 of the case to a litigation funder with the contract t(x) = t0 + t1x.
49Note that a party who lacks direct access to the capital market would be at a bargaining
disadvantage. If the defendant lacks access, the plaintiff could charge more than r0 for the
insurance policy. In the text, we maintain the original market price r0 for illustrative ease.
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investor could make a take-it-or-leave-it contract offer to the plaintiff before trial.
The equilibrium contract offer would be Pareto-optimal, and would necessarily
satisfy the condition in equation (11).50 Although the lump-sum payment would
be lower than it was before (because the third party investor can capture rents),
the slope of the contract would be exactly the same as in equation (12).51 Simi-
larly, if a third party had some market power over the defendant, he could demand
a higher lump-sum payment than r0 = (1− r1)µ0. However, the slope of the con-
tract r1 would not depend on the allocation of bargaining power. Thus, the slopes
of the outside contracts r1 and t1, and the aggregate cost of risk, do not depend
on the competitiveness of the capital market.
Negative Expected Value Claims. Our earlier analysis assumed that the plaintiff
always had a credible threat to litigate. That is, we assumed that the plaintiff’s
subjective payoff from a naked trial was non-negative, µp − apσ2/2 − cp ≥ 0.
So, if negotiations broke down, the plaintiff would not want to drop the case. If
instead the plaintiff’s case had negative expected value, then the plaintiff could
not credibly threaten the defendant to go to trial. The defendant, knowing that
the plaintiff’s case is not viable and would be dropped, could simply refuse to
participate in contract negotiations.52 With outside contracts, the plaintiff has a
stronger threat to go to trial. If negotiations with the defendant break down, the
plaintiff can turn to the capital market, boosting the plaintiff’s subjective value
from litigation. The plaintiff-litigation funder team would have a credible threat
to go to trial when (1−t1)µ0+t1µp−apt21σ2/2−cp ≥ 0. Because litigation funding
improves the plaintiff’s outside option, it strengthens the plaintiff’s threat to go
to trial and benefits the plaintiff (in a subjective sense) at the expense of the
defendant.
Endogenous Litigation Spending. In the model, the costs of litigation were exoge-
nous and did not depend on the inside or outside contracts signed. In practice,
these contracts could change the equilibrium incentives of the parties to invest in
litigation. One can easily extend the model to consider litigation as a rent-seeking
contest where, by spending additional money in preparation for trial, a party can
50We assume that outside contracts are negotiated on a case-by-case basis. If outside investors
had to offer the same contract terms to all litigants, then monopoly distortions could arise.
51The insight that market power would not change the slope of the contract is also evident
from our general characterization of inside contracts in (6). All Pareto-optimal contracts share
the same slope.
52Inside contracting may still arise when µp is much larger than µd so that the slope is greater
than one. In this case, the lump-sum payment is negative and the plaintiff pays the defendant
to go to trial as before.
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move a factfinder’s decision in his or her favor.53 Inside contracts that mitigate
the risk of trial would also curb the parties’ incentives to spend money litigating
the suit.54 This private and social benefit may be foregone when the parties con-
tract instead with third-party investors. Intuitively, the plaintiff-investor team
shares the unmitigated damage award, and defendant-investor team bears the
corresponding unmitigated loss. Because each team faces the full exposure of a
trial, they would have no joint incentive to curb their spending.55
Wealth Constraints. In our analysis, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant were
wealth constrained. The plaintiff had adequate funds to pay for the cost of
litigation cp and the defendant had adequate resources to pay for the litigation
costs cd and any damage award x, and we placed no restriction on the lump-
sum transfer payments in their inside and outside contracts. These assumptions
may be appropriate in some circumstances, such as in settings involving well-
heeled companies and commercial litigation. In settings where plaintiffs and
their lawyers are liquidity constrained, better access to litigation funding and
other outside contracts may be instrumental for giving plaintiffs greater access
to the legal system. Without outside capital, plaintiffs may simply be unable to
proceed to trial and defendants, knowing this, would refuse to settle.56
High-Low Agreements. In actual litigation practice, one observes partial settle-
ment agreements with a variety of functional forms. Although some of these
agreements are linear, others are not.57 One relatively common contingent settle-
ment contract is the high-low agreement, where the ultimate payout is constrained
by a floor and a ceiling (Prescott et al., 2014; Prescott and Spier, 2016).58
53See the Online Appendix and Prescott et al. (2014) for formal models. See Konrad (2009)
for a survey of the contest literature. Applications to litigation include Posner (1973, appendix),
Katz (1988), and Rosenberg and Spier (2014).
54When designing their inside contract, the parties have a joint incentive to make it flatter
(relative to what they would do with exogenous litigation costs) as a commitment to not engage
in future wasteful rent seeking.
55This argument is premised on the assumption that there is Coasian bargaining between a
litigant and his/her financial service provider, but not between the two litigants. See the Online
Appendix for details and discussion.
56A potentially insolvent defendant may have less incentive to purchase a generous insurance
policy because the premiums would be high and the benefit of generous insurance may largely
accrue to the plaintiff.
57In 2010, SAP paid Oracle $120 million in exchange for Oracle agreeing not to seek punitive
damages. In Palimere v. Supermarkets in footnote 2, the parties agreed to a 75%/25% split of
damages. See Prescott and Spier (2016) for these and additional examples.
58With a high-low agreement, the plaintiff has the option to sell the claim for the floor value
(put option), and the defendant has the option to buy the claim for the ceiling value (call
option). See footnote 3.
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It is not difficult to construct subjective beliefs and preferences that generate
high-low agreements in equilibrium (or contracts that are “close” to high-low
agreements). First, high-low agreements are often optimal when the parties’
subjective beliefs are binary on a common support. For example, the parties may
share common beliefs about the level of damages, but fundamentally disagree
about the probability that the plaintiff will win. Moderately risk-averse parties
would use a high-low contract to pull the binary outcomes (“win” and “lose”)
closer together.59 Second, one can modify normally-distributed beliefs in a way
that is fully consistent with high-low agreements. Technically, one could change
the shape of the tails so that the likelihood ratios in the tail regions are constant.60
Finally, with triangular distributions with different modes and CARA preferences,
one can get contracts that are remarkably similar to high-low contracts.61
That said, the popularity of high-low agreements in litigation practice is prob-
ably due more to their simplicity and intuitive appeal than to their analytical
purity. In practice, it is not uncommon for the “high” and the “low” values to
be the plaintiff’s and defendant’s last and final settlement offers before reaching
a bargaining impasse. In the examples given above, generating a slope of exactly
one, s′(x) ≡ 1, in some middle region requires a knife-edged configuration of
parameter values.62 Although high-low agreements may not be Pareto optimal,
they can avoid extreme outcomes and thus accomplish the risk-sharing benefits
of more elaborate and sophisticated schemes.
3 Welfare Analysis
 We now compare the three contractual regimes – naked trials, inside con-
tracts, and outside contracts – in terms of their subjective value to the litigants
and their costs to society.
Before we begin, it is helpful to define a piece of new notation. Let µ̂0 be
the following weighted average of the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s subjective
59See Prescott et al. (2014).
60Consider a bounded support that is divided into three regions. Suppose that the beliefs
follow the normal curves in the middle region, but have modified tails with constant likelihood
ratios fp(x)/fd(x) in the bottom and top regions (uniform or linear beliefs suffice).
61Suppose fp(x) and fd(x) are triangular and defined on [20, 120] (in thousands) with mode
values 40 and 100. The ratio fp(x)/fd(x) is constant when x < 40 or x > 100, creating a floor
and ceiling. If ap + ad = .00002, the slope for x ∈ [40, 100] is approximately one.
62If µp = 90, µd = 50, σ = 20 and ap + ad = .0002, the inside contract has a slope of s1 = .50.
If ap + ad = .0001 instead, then the slope is unity. See the Online Appendix for further details.
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beliefs, µp and µd:
µ̂0 =
adµp + apµd
ap + ad
. (18)
When the beliefs of the external capital market coincide with this threshold, so
µ0 = µ̂0, then slopes of the inside contract s(x) and the slopes of the outside
contracts t(x) and r(x) are all exactly the same.
The fact that there exists a threshold µ̂0 where the slopes of the three contracts
coincide is intuitive. The inside contract s(x) = s0 +s1x in equation (6) creates a
Pareto-optimal allocation of risk for the plaintiff and defendant (from a subjective
perspective). By the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics, this
allocation can be supported as a competitive equilibrium. If the price of the
lawsuit were fixed at µ̂0 defined in (18), the plaintiff would choose to keep fraction
s1 of the lawsuit and sell the residual fraction. Similarly, the defendant would
choose to retain fraction s1 of the risk and purchase insurance for the residual
fraction. So, when the market price of the lawsuit is µ̂0, then the slopes of the
inside and outside contracts coincide: r1 = s1 = t1.
LEMMA 1: If µ0 = µ̂0 then r1 = s1 = t1, if µ0 < µ̂0 then r1 < s1 < t1, and if
µ0 > µ̂0 then r1 > s1 > t1 where r1, s1, and t1 are defined in (6), (12), and (13).
Figure 1 shows how the slopes of the three contracts depend on the competitive
market price µ0 for the case where µd < µp. If the capital market has the same
beliefs as the defendant, so µ0 = µd, then the defendant insures the entire loss at
trial (r1 = 0) and the plaintiff sells part (but less than one hundred percent) of
the case to litigation funders (t1 > 0). As the outside market price µ0 rises, two
things happen: the defendant purchases less insurance (r1 rises) and the plaintiff
seeks more litigation funding (t1 falls). At the other end of the spectrum, when
µ0 = µp, the plaintiff sells the entire lawsuit to third-party investors (t1 = 0) for
a competitive price µ0 and the defendant purchases partial insurance (r1 > 0).
When µ0 = µ̂0, the stake sold by the plaintiff is equal to the insurance demanded
by the defendant and r1 = s1 = t1.
***INSERT FIGURE 1 AT TOP OF PAGE ABOUT HERE***
 The Subjective Benefits of Litigation. We now compare the parties’
joint subjective value in the three contractual regimes – naked trials, inside con-
tracts, and outside contracts.
First, and most obviously, the parties are subjectively better off with inside
contracts than with naked trials. This follows from revealed preference. More in-
terestingly, the plaintiff and defendant are weakly better off (in a joint subjective
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sense) when they can transact with the outside capital market. With inside con-
tracts, the fortunes of the plaintiff and defendant are inextricably tied together. In
contrast, the outside market affords the litigants the flexibility to fine-tune their
stakes to better suit their subjective beliefs and risk preferences.63 Through the
outside market, the plaintiff and defendant can decouple their financial interests,
and this works to their mutual advantage.
To see these results formally, compare the subjective joint benefit of litigation
from the outside contracts B0() given in equation (15) to the subjective joint
benefit of the inside contract B∗() given in equation (8). Using the definition of
µ̂0 in (18), one can show that
B0() = B∗() +
(
ap + ad
2apadσ2
)
(µ0 − µ̂0)2. (19)
Because (µ0 − µ̂0)2 ≥ 0, we have B0() ≥ B∗(). The plaintiff and defendant are
weakly better off with outside contracting than with inside contracting. Next,
comparing the subjective joint benefit of the inside contract represented in equa-
tion (7) to the joint benefit of the naked trial BN() in (1), we find that
B∗() = BN() + (ap + ad)σ
2
2
(1− s1)2 . (20)
The inside contract creates more value than the naked trial when the slope of the
inside contract s1 6= 1. We have the following result.
PROPOSITION 1: The joint subjective value of litigation is lowest when all
contingent contracts are prohibited, weakly higher when only inside contracts be-
tween the parties to the dispute are permitted, and weakly higher still when parties
are free to write contracts with the outside capital market, BN() ≤ B∗() ≤ B0().
Inside and outside contracts create the same joint subjective value if and only if
the capital market’s beliefs are µ0 = µ̂0 defined in (18). Inside contracts and naked
trials create the same joint subjective value if and only if the inside contract in
(6) has a slope of one, s1 = 1.
When the capital market’s beliefs are a properly weighted average of the
litigants’ beliefs, µ0 = µ̂0, then the parties do just as well contracting with each
other as they do contracting with third parties, B∗() = B0(). In other words,
there is a measure zero set of parameter values that eliminates the value of trading
63By Lemma 1, if µ0 < µ̂0 then r1 < s1 < t1. With outside contracts, the defendant chooses
to insure a higher fractional stake of the case than the plaintiff chooses to sell.
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with outside investors.64 This follows from the fact that when µ0 = µ̂0, the slopes
of all three contracts are the same, r1 = s1 = t1 (Lemma 1). Given the market
price µ̂0, the plaintiff would choose to sell a fraction 1 − s1 of the lawsuit to a
litigation funder for a lump-sum payment (1 − s1)µ̂0, and the defendant would
pay investors (1 − s1)µ̂0 to insure a fraction 1 − s1 of their future loss. In this
knife-edged case, the plaintiff and the defendant do not need the outside capital
market. They can achieve the very same subjective benefits by contracting with
each other and cutting out the middlemen.
This result is perhaps all the more surprising because by design we have
stacked the deck in favor of third-party investors by assuming that they are risk
neutral, competitive, and transaction-cost free. If there were any transactions
costs of dealing with outside suppliers of capital (costs of negotiating contracts,
agency, or due diligence), then there will be a range of parameter values where
the parties are better off forgoing the external capital market. In other words,
in practice the defendant may be in a better position than the market to supply
funding to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff may be in a better position than the
market to supply insurance to the defendant.
Although the plaintiff and the defendant are subjectively better off in a joint
sense when outside capital markets are available, it does not necessarily follow
that the plaintiff and defendant are better off individually. Whether an individual
litigant is better off or worse off will depend on the beliefs of the capital market,
µ0, how risk averse they are, and the bargaining power of the litigants when
negotiating the inside contract, pi and 1 − pi. The next proposition provides
a partial ranking of the individual subjective benefits of outside versus inside
contracting. In the proposition, the bargaining power threshold pi depends on
the risk aversion of the two parties and is defined as follows:
pi =
ad
ap + ad
. (21)
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose µ0 = µ̂0. The defendant is better off (worse off)
and the plaintiff is worse off (better off) with the outside contract than with the
inside contract if the defendant’s bargaining power is low (high), pi < pi (pi > pi).
Suppose pi = pi. The defendant is better off (worse off) and the plaintiff is worse
off (better off) with the outside contract than with the inside contract when the
capital market believes that the damages are low (high), µp − apσ2 < µ0 < µ̂0
(µ̂0 < µ0 < µd + adσ
2).
64If µp = µd, then the inside contract would have a slope of zero – the plaintiff and defendant
would face no risk. If µ0 = µ̂0 = µp = µd, then outside investors would purchase one hundred
percent of the plaintiff’s case and insure one hundred percent of the defendant’s case.
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Intuitively, the plaintiff will benefit from selling an equity stake to the outside
capital market if the price that the outside market will pay is higher than than
the inside price (the price that the plaintiff would otherwise negotiate with the
defendant). The outside market price will tend to be high when the capital market
believes that the expected damages are high, µ0 > µ̂0. The inside contract price
will tend to be low when the plaintiff’s bargaining power is low (pi is high). On
the flip side, the defendant would benefit from purchasing insurance from the
outside market if the price of that insurance is lower than the inside contract
price. Thus, the defendant will tend to be better off with the outside contract
when the market price µ0 is low and when the defendant’s bargaining position is
weak (pi is low). Finally, note that if the plaintiff is much more averse to risk than
the defendant then the plaintiff will be in a very bad bargaining position when
negotiating an inside contract with the defendant. Formally, when the plaintiff
is very risk averse, then pi in (21) is very small. In this case, the plaintiff is likely
to obtain significant benefits from access to the outside capital market.
 The Social Costs of Litigation. We begin by ranking the regimes
according to the costs of litigation, or equivalently the litigation rate. Re-
call that the parties will choose to go to trial when the sum of their litigation
costs, cp + cd, is smaller than the joint subjective benefit of litigation. Because
the parties’ joint subjective benefits of litigation are ranked in Proposition 1,
BN() ≤ B∗() ≤ B0(), we have the following result.
PROPOSITION 3: The litigation rate (and litigation costs) are lowest when
all contingent contracts are prohibited, weakly higher when only inside contracts
between the parties to the dispute are permitted, and weakly higher still when
parties are free to write contracts with the outside capital market.
This result is not surprising. By revealed preference, parties enter into con-
tracts for the very purpose of making trial more attractive by mitigating risk
and/or capturing benefits of mutual speculation. So, when compared with a world
where contracting on the trial outcome is impossible or prohibited, contingent
contracts will tend to discourage settlement and stimulate litigation. Although
we do not have direct empirical proof that inside contracts will increase the rate of
litigation in practice, the experience of New York’s Summary Jury Trial Program
is suggestive. In a data set of more than 2,700 lawsuits that entered this program,
more than eighty percent included high-low contracts (Prescott and Spier, 2016).
Furthermore, the cases with high-low agreements were significantly less likely to
settle out of court.65
65One cannot attribute this pattern to causation, of course. Cases that are unlikely to settle
have a greater need for high-low agreements.
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We will now rank the three contractual regimes according to their aggregate
litigation risks. Comparing the risks R∗() from the inside contract in (9) to the
risk RN() from the naked trial in (2) we have:
R∗() = RN()s21 (22)
where s1 is the slope of the equilibrium inside contract (6). Compared with
a naked trial, the inside contract may either raise or lower the sum of the risk
premiums, depending on whether the contract mitigates the risk (the slope s21 < 1)
or amplifies the risk (s21 > 1). Next, comparing R
∗() to the risks from the outside
contract R0() in (16) and using the definition of µ̂0 in (18), we show in the
Appendix that:
R0() = R∗() +
(
ap + ad
2apadσ2
)
(µ0 − µ̂0)2. (23)
When the capital market’s beliefs satisfy µ0 = µ̂0, then outside contracts
and inside contracts create the same level of risk. This follows from our earlier
result that r1 = s1 = t1. More strikingly, equation (23) tells us that outside
contracts have a strictly higher costs of risk bearing whenever µ0 6= µ̂0. If µ0 <
µ̂0, for example, then r1 < s1 < t1. In this case, the outside contract exposes
the defendant to less risk and exposes the plaintiff to more risk than the inside
contract. But taken together, the sum of the risk premiums is necessarily higher.66
Thus, under the assumptions of the model, allowing the parties to the dispute
to write contracts with risk-neutral competitive investors will never lower the
amount of aggregate risk that they face, and will generally increase it.
PROPOSITION 4: The aggregate costs of risk bearing are smaller with inside
contracts than naked trials when the inside contracts mitigate risk (s21 < 1) and
are larger when the inside contracts amplify the risk (s21 > 1). Outside contracts
with third-party suppliers of capital may create more aggregate risk than inside
contracts, R0() ≥ R∗().
The result that outside contracts may actually raise the aggregate cost of risk-
bearing (relative to inside contracts) is interesting. Recall that contracts create
subjective value in two ways: risk allocation and speculation. Intuitively, parties
who are limited to inside contracts have a joint subjective interest in supplying
each other with additional insurance and forgoing some subjective benefits of
speculation. The availability of risk neutral third-party investors gives the par-
ties more degrees of freedom and greater opportunities for mutual speculation,
66Conversely, if µ0 > µ̂0, then the outside contract exposes the plaintiff to less risk and the
defendant to more risk but the sum of the risk premiums still rise.
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raising the overall risk level. This insight is aligned with recent findings in the
behavioral finance literature where the introduction of new financial products in-
creases market risk when traders have heterogeneous beliefs (Simsek, 2013; Weyl,
2007; Dieckmann, 2011).
Even though the parties may believe subjectively that contingent contracts are
in their mutual interest at the time of contracting, they may be jointly worse off
when their payoffs are evaluated using a single set of objective beliefs. Recall that
we defined social welfare to be the sum of the certainty equivalents of all parties
(the litigants and the outside investors), evaluated using a single set of objective
beliefs rather than the parties’ subjective beliefs. If the case goes to trial, then
social welfare reflects the costs of risk bearing and the costs of litigation,
Si() = −Ri()− (cp + cd). (24)
When the parties’ payoffs are evaluated with a single set of beliefs, the parties’
subjective benefit of speculation disappears and all that remains are the trial
risks, Ri(), and the litigation costs, cp + cd.
PROPOSITION 5: If the slope of the inside contract s1 satisfies s
2
1 < 1 and
the costs of litigation are not too large, cp + cd < B
N(), then social welfare is
strictly higher with the inside contract than with a naked trial, S∗() > SN().
If cp + cd > B
N() or s21 > 1 then social welfare is weakly lower with the inside
contract than with a naked trial, S∗() < SN() Social welfare is weakly lower when
the litigants can write outside contracts with third-party investors than when they
can only write inside contracts with each other, S0() ≤ S∗().
According to Proposition 5, inside contracts may either raise or lower social
welfare relative to a naked trial. If cp + cd < B
N() ≤ B∗(), then the case
will go to trial rather than settle in both the naked-trial and inside-contracting
regimes. Because the litigation costs are the same in both regimes, any difference
in social welfare would hinge on trial risks. If the slope of the inside contract
is smaller than one, s21 < 1, then the inside contract mitigates risk relative to a
naked trial and increases social welfare. Conversely, if s21 > 1, then the inside
contract amplifies risk relative to a naked trial and reduces social welfare. If
BN() < cp + cd ≤ B∗(), then the case will settle out of court in the naked-trial
regime but will go to trial in the inside-contracting regime. In this case, inside
contracting reduces social welfare.
Proposition 5 also implies that social welfare is lower when parties can write
contracts with outside investors than when they are restricted to inside contracts.
This is true for two reasons. First, cases are more likely to go to trial with outside
contracts than inside contracts, raising the costs of litigation (Proposition 3).
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Second, the aggregate cost of risk bearing is lower with inside contracts than
with outside contracts (Proposition 4). In this sense, society would be better off
prohibiting parties from entering into contracts with outside investors and forcing
them to instead contract just with each other.
 Discussion. Our welfare analysis focused exclusively on the subjective
benefits of the litigants and the costs and aggregate risks of litigation. There are
additional welfare concerns that are outside of our formal model but nonetheless
important to keep in mind.
The Defendant’s Incentives for Care. The anticipation of contingent contracting
could of course influence the behavior of potential defendants ex ante, before law-
suits even arise. In the model, the litigants are better off ex post with contingent
contracting. This follows from revealed preference, as the litigants enter into
contingent contracts willingly.67 If a potential defendant anticipates receiving
positive benefits of future contingent contracting, then the party’s incentives to
take precautions to avoid harming the prospective plaintiff would be diluted. In
this case, the potential defendant would take fewer precautions to avoid causing
harm and there will be more accidents in equilibrium.68
The fact that litigants perceive themselves to be better off ex post with contin-
gent contracting does not necessarily imply that litigants are subjectively better
off ex ante. In many cases, individuals may share the same objective beliefs be-
fore accidents arise, but then fall victim to self-serving biases ex post, after they
learn whether they are the victims (plaintiffs) or the injurers (defendants). Inso-
far as potential defendants anticipate succumbing to future self-serving bias, and
consequently bearing larger costs if the plaintiff-to-be suffers harm, a potential
defendant would have stronger incentives to take precautions to avoid accidents.
In this scenario, there would be fewer accidents in equilibrium.
The Plaintiff’s Decision to Bring Suit. The opportunity to turn to the capital
market for outside funding could in practice affect the plaintiff’s decision to file a
lawsuit against the defendant. As discussed earlier, access to the outside capital
market can turn what would otherwise have been a negative expected value case
into a positive expected value one. If negotiations break down, then the capital
market might share the risk or facilitate speculation, thus improving the plaintiff’s
67A similar argument applies to simple non-contingent settlements. See surveys by Spier
(2007) and Daughety and Reinganum (2012) for a general discussion of the effects of litigation
and settlement on deterrence, including the role of litigation costs.
68This would obviously be bad for social welfare if the defendant had been under-deterred to
begin with, but could raise welfare if the defendant had been over-deterred. See Shavell (1997)
on the divergence between the private and social incentive to litigate.
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outside option.69 The capital market can also make litigation feasible if the
plaintiff is wealth constrained.
In these cases, access to litigation funding by the plaintiff will lead to more
trials, and hence higher litigation costs and more aggregate risk, reinforcing our
earlier results. Because litigation funding can turn a negative expected value case
into one that is viable, this will also feed back into providing stronger incentives
for the defendant to take precautions to avoid harming a potential plaintiff in
the first place. This is socially valuable if the defendant was otherwise under-
deterred. But if the negative expected value claim is one that has little social
value (a largely frivolous case that will not improve the defendant’s incentives for
care), the availability of litigation funding would be socially harmful.
Other Welfare Effects. Although many of the costs of litigation are privately
borne by the parties themselves, others are subsidized by taxpayers. The time
costs of the judge, the foregone opportunities of jury members, and the costs of
overhead and infrastructure are not fully paid for by the direct users of the court’s
services. Thus, the costs of litigation considered by the parties when crafting their
settlement strategies may well understate the actual costs of increased litigation.
Note also that lawsuits may in some circumstances create external benefits. One
benefit is the development of case law, the stock of which may be viewed as a
public good. Then, insofar as inside contracts stimulate additional litigation,
they could increase the stock of this public good.70
Aggregate Risk Bearing. Under the assumptions of our model (risk-averse liti-
gants, CARA preferences, normally-distributed beliefs, etc.), outside contracts
with risk-neutral third-party investors create more aggregate risk than inside
contracts. This result may be seen in a numerical example where µp = 90, µd =
50, µ0 = 80 and σ = 20, all in thousands, and risk aversion coefficients ap =
ad = .0001 (see the Online Appendix). With this configuration of parameter
values, the inside contract has a slope of s1 = .50, so the plaintiff sells half of
the case to the defendant (equivalently, the defendant buys insurance for half of
the case from the plaintiff). With outside contracts, the plaintiff bears less risk
(t1 = .25) and the defendant bears more risk (r1 = .75). The sum of the plaintiff’s
and defendant’s risk premiums is higher with outside contracts than with inside
contracts because (.25)2 + (.75)2 > (.50)2 + (.50)2.
The result that outside contracts lead to weakly higher costs of risk bearing,
although interesting and provocative, was obtained under strong and stylized as-
69Note that a liquidity constrained plaintiff would benefit even more, as the outside capital
market would make the lawsuit feasible.
70This would lead a more efficient allocation of resources and incentives for care. See Landes
and Posner (1976) for an early theoretical and empirical analysis of precedent.
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sumptions. In our model, both inside and outside contracts become steeper (more
risky) when the parties become less risk averse. When ap is very small, the plain-
tiff’s outside contract with the capital market amplifies risk rather than reduces
it. Indeed, as ap approaches zero, the plaintiff’s risk premium in (16) increases
without bound.71 If there were natural bounds on the ability of litigants to double
down in this way, or legal constraints (anti-gambling statutes, for example), then
the risk premiums would not increase without bound. Generalizing our model
to include other preferences, belief structures, and liquidity constraints is beyond
the scope of our article and is left as an avenue for further work.
4 Conclusion
 In this article, two risk-averse parties with different subjective beliefs nego-
tiate in the shadow of a pending trial. Through contingent settlement contracts,
the parties may condition their future transfer payments on the trial outcome
itself. Contingent settlement contracts are feasible, legal, and may offer signifi-
cant private benefits relative to a full settlement or a “naked trial.” As the use of
these contracts can make trial more attractive for the parties, these contracts will
tend to increase the probability of litigation. Compared to a world where these
contracts are not possible, risk could be lower or higher depending on whether the
parties choose to mitigate trial risk or to amplify it. Access to a well-functioning
capital market will (weakly) improve the subjective joint payoffs of the parties
relative to what they could achieve on their own. However, under the assump-
tions of our model, access to the capital market increases litigation costs and the
costs of risk bearing.
Strikingly, our analysis suggests parties to a dispute can themselves secure
many of the risk-shifting benefits provided by third-party investors.72 Recall that
equilibrium inside contracts include a lump-sum payment from the defendant to
the plaintiff coupled with a contingent payment (e.g., a fraction of the court’s
award). Through this contract, the defendant is effectively playing the role of a
litigation funder, paying a lump-sum purchase price to the plaintiff in exchange
for a stake in the plaintiff’s claim. On the flip side, the plaintiff is effectively
playing the role of an insurer. The lump-sum payment made by the defendant
is analogous to an insurance premium. In return for this premium, the plaintiff-
insurer bears a portion of the defendant’s loss. Our theory suggests that parties
71Similarly, as ad approaches zero, the defendant’s risk premium diverges. Note that there
is a discontinuity: When the litigants are both risk neutral, there is no social cost associated
with extreme gambling. We thank a referee for pointing this out.
72Bypassing the third-party investors can also reduce transactions costs.
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are more likely to write creative contingent contracts with each other in settings
where capital markets are imperfect and fail to operate efficiently.73
Although the primary focus of this article is litigation, our ideas may extend
to other economic settings as well. Consider for example a small farmer who is
planting a crop in advance of harvest, and a local food processor. The farmer and
processor may choose to fix the sale price several months in advance of the harvest,
eliminating the pricing risk, or sign a forward contract where the sale price is
contingent on a benchmark provided by a reporting service (Paul et al., 1985).
Alternatively, the farmer and processor might hedge their positions by contracting
with third parties on a formal exchange. Through put and call options and other
financial instruments, the farmer and processor can hedge risk and/or speculate
on future commodity prices.74 Our results imply that the aggregate risk borne in
the vertical chain may actually be higher when the participants have access to the
capital market and can actively trade in futures and options. The possible link
between futures markets and price volatility has, historically, prompted disdain
for speculators and discomfort with organized futures and options exchanges.75
Our model is premised on the idea that the parties involved in litigation
– the plaintiff and the defendant – may hold different subjective beliefs about
the outcome at trial. Importantly, our model assumes that the litigants are
stubborn in their beliefs and do not revise or update them when confronted with
the differing opinions of others (including the capital market). Although we
believe that our theoretical approach is valuable and empirically relevant, we do
not think that this is the only valuable approach. Future research might explore
contracting in a dynamic environment that includes Bayesian learning and/or
asymmetric information. For example, litigants’ beliefs may converge over time
and through the discovery process as more details about the case come to light.76
In addition, privately-informed parties may use their inside and outside contracts
to signal the value of their claims to their opponents and the judge or jury.77
Finally, our work raises important policy questions. For example, should liti-
73In the US, after-the-event insurance is rare. Note, however, that litigation funder Burford
Capital has invested in defense-side deals (Molot, 2014). In England, where legal fees are shifted
to the loser, litigation insurance policies are not uncommon (Molot 2009).
74For example, a farmer may buy one call option at a low strike price while simultaneously
selling a second call option at a higher strike price. As with the high-low contract in litigation,
this creates a floor and a ceiling for the farmer’s return.
75In 1958, the United States Congress passed Public Law 85-839, the “Onion Futures Act,”
to prohibit onion futures trading because “speculative activity in the futures markets causes
such severe and unwarranted fluctuations in the price of cash onions ...”
76Yildiz and Vasserman (2016) combine Bayesian learning with divergent beliefs.
77See Lavie and Tabbach (2017) for signaling with inside contracts and Avraham and Wick-
elgren (2014) for signaling with outside contracts.
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gants be required to disclose their financial arrangements, both inside and outside,
to courts? In practice, plaintiffs and defendants often hide their contingent set-
tlement contracts (e.g., high-low agreements) from the judge and jury, out of
an apparent concern that doing so could bias the court’s judgment.78 Litigation
funding contracts are almost never disclosed, as plaintiffs and their attorneys
are typically bound by nondisclosure agreements.79 In response to this lack of
transparency, three members of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee proposed
the Litigation Funding Transparency Act of 2018 which would require certain
litigants to disclose the identity of “any commercial enterprise” that has a con-
tingent financial interest in the outcome (settlement or judgment) of a case, and
to produce the agreements “for inspection and copying.” This is an exciting
direction for future research.80
78See Prescott and Spier (2016).
79Litigation funders view these contracts as proprietary. See Steinitz (2012).
80In his public statement, chairman Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) says “for too long, obscure liti-
gation funding agreements have secretly funneled money into our civil justice system, all for the
purpose of profiting off someone else’s case.” See https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-
releases/grassley-tillis-cornyn-introduce-bill-shine-light-third-party-litigation.
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Appendix
Proof of Equation (5): Because u′i(z) = ai exp(−aiz)), we have
fp(x)
fd(x)
ap exp[−ap(s(x)− cp)]
ad exp[−ad(−s(x)− cd)] = κ
where κ is a constant. Using the property that exp(m)/ exp(n) = exp(m − n)
this becomes
fp(x)
fd(x)
ap
ad
exp[−(ap + ad)s(x) + apcp − adcd)] = κ.
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides, and using the property that ln(mn) =
ln(m) + ln(m), we have
ln
(
fp(x)
fd(x)
)
+ ln
(
ap
ad
)
− (ap + ad)s(x) + apcp − adcd = ln(κ).
Solving for s(x) and renaming the collection of constant terms k gives (5). 
Proof of Equation(6): The probability density function for party i = p, d is
fi(x) =
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(−(x− µi)2
2σ2
)
,
which implies
fp(x)
fd(x)
= exp
[−(x− µp)2 + (x− µd)2
2σ2
]
.
Substituting this likelihood ratio into equation (5) yields
s(x) = k +
(
1
ap + ad
)(−(x− µp)2 + (x− µd)2
2σ2
)
.
Expanding the numerator and rearranging terms, this becomes:
s(x) = k −
(
1
ap + ad
)(
µ2p − µ2d
2σ2
)
+
(
1
ap + ad
)(
2µpx− 2µdx
2σ2
)
.
The first two terms are constant, which we call s0, and a slight rearranging of the
last term gives equation (6). 
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Proof of Equation (11): Any Pareto-optimal contract between the plaintiff
and the capital market satisfies
fp(x)
f0(x)
u′p(t(x)− cp)
u′0(x− t(x))
= k
where k is a constant. Because u′i(z) = ai exp(−aiz)), we have
fp(x)
f0(x)
ap exp[−ap(t(x)− cp)]
a0 exp[−a0(x− t(x))] = κ
where κ is a constant. The rest of the proof follows closely the proof of equation
(5) and is omitted. 
Proof of Equation (12): The proof closely mirrors the proof of equation (6)
and is omitted.
Proof of Equation (13): Any Pareto-optimal contract between the defendant
and the capital market satisfies:
f0(x)
fd(x)
u′0(−x+ r(x))
u′d(−r(x)− cd)
= k,
where k is a constant. Because u′i(z) = ai exp(−aiz)), we have
f0(x)
fd(x)
a0 exp[−a0(−x+ r(x))]
ad exp[−ad(−r(x)− cd)] = κ
where κ is a constant. The rest of the proof follows closely the proofs of equations
(5) and (6), and the details are omitted. The constant terms t0 = (1− t1)µ0 and
r0 = (1− r1)µ0 allow the outside investors to break even on average. 
Coexistence of Inside and Outside Contracting. Suppose that the plaintiff
and defendant purchase Pareto-optimal outside contracts from a competitive cap-
ital market as described in (12) and (13). Then, the parties derive no additional
value from contracting with each other.
Proof: The plaintiff’s (subjective) certainty equivalent of the competitively-
supplied contract is (1 − t1)µ0 + t1µp − apt21σ2/2 where t1 is defined in (12).
Let µ˜p = (1− t1)µ0 + t1µp and let a˜p = apt21. The plaintiff’s certainty equivalent
may be written as µ˜p− a˜pσ2/2. So, our funded plaintiff is in the same position as
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a plaintiff with risk aversion coefficient a˜p normally-distributed beliefs with mean
µ˜p who is facing a naked trial.
Similarly, the defendant’s certainty equivalent is (1− r1)µ0 + r1µd + adr21σ2/2
where r1 is defined in (13). This may be written as µ˜d + a˜dσ
2/2 where µ˜d =
(1− r1)µ0 + r1µd and a˜d = adr21. So, our defendant is in the same position as an
uninsured defendant with beliefs µ˜d and risk aversion coefficient a˜d who is facing
a naked trial. We will now show that there are no gains from trade between these
two (fictional) parties.
The Pareto-optimal inside contract (6) is
s1 =
µ˜p − µ˜d
(a˜p + a˜d)σ2
Substituting the expressions above, this becomes
s1 =
(r1 − t1)µ0 + t1µp − r1µd
(apt21 + adr
2
1)σ
2
=
t1(µp − µ0) + r1(µo − µd)
(apt21 + adr
2
1)σ
2
.
Substituting µp − µ0 = apσ2t1 and µ0 − µd = adσ2r1 from (12) and (13),
s1 =
apσ
2t21 + adσ
2r21
(apt21 + adr
2
1)σ
2
= 1. 
Proof of Lemma 1: Using the definitions, s1 > t1 if and only if
µp−µd
(ap+ad)σ2
>
µp−µ0
apσ2
. Canceling σ2 and cross multiplying, this becomes ap(µp − µd) > (ap +
ad)(µp − µ0) or equivalently µ0(ap + ad) > adµp + apµd. Dividing both sides by
ap + ad gives µ0 >
adµp+apµd
ap+ad
= µ̂0. Similarly, s1 > r1 if and only if
µp−µd
(ap+ad)σ2
>
µ0−µd
adσ2
. Rearranging terms, ad(µp − µd) > (ap + ad)(µ0 − µd), or equivalently
µ0(ap + ad) < adµp + apµd. Dividing by ap + ad gives us µ0 <
adµp+apµd
ap+ad
= µ̂0. 
Proof of Equation (19): Using expressions (1) and (8) we have
B∗()−BN() = (ap + ad)σ
2
2
[(
µp − µd
(ap + ad)σ2
)2
− 2
(
µp − µd
(ap + ad)σ2
)
+ 1
]
.
Rewriting,
B∗() = BN() + (ap + ad)σ
2
2
[
1− µp − µd
(ap + ad)σ2
]2
.
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Next, expanding out expression (15) we have
B0(µ0, µp, µd, ap, ad, σ
2) =
1
2apadσ2
[
ad(µp − µ0)2 + ap(µ0 − µd)2
]
,
which after some algebraic manipulation becomes
B0() = ap + ad
2apadσ2
[
µ20 − 2µ0
(
adµp + apµd
ap + ad
)
+
adµ
2
p + apµ
2
d
ap + ad
]
.
Recalling the definition of µ̂0 in (18), this may be rewritten as
B0() = ap + ad
2apadσ2
[
(µ0 − µ̂0)2 +
apad(µp − µd)2
(ap + ad)2
]
,
or equivalently
B0() =
(
ap + ad
2apadσ2
)
(µ0 − µ̂0)2 +
(µp − µd)2
2(ap + ad)σ2
.
Finally, using the definition of B∗() in (8) gives
B0() =
(
ap + ad
2apadσ2
)
(µ0 − µ̂0)2 +B∗(). 
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider first the inside contract in (6) where s1 =
µp−µd
(ap+ad)σ2
and s0 is negotiated between the plaintiff and defendant.
With probability pi, the defendant makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract offer
to the plaintiff. The lump sum s0 would make the plaintiff indifferent between
accepting the inside contract going to court where the plaintiff would receive a
subjective value of µp − apσ2/2. So, when the defendant makes the offer, the
plaintiff receives the outside option payoff of µp − apσ2/2. If the plaintiff could
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the defendant instead, the plaintiff would choose
s0 to make the defendant indifferent between the inside contract and a naked trial,
s0 + s1µd +
ads
2
1σ
2
2
= µd + adσ
2/2. Rearranging terms, the plaintiff would offer
s1 =
µp−µd
(ap+ad)σ2
and s0 where
s0 = µd + adσ
2/2− s1µd −
ads
2
1σ
2
2
The plaintiff’s private subjective value from this is therefore
s0 + s1µp −
aps
2
1σ
2
2
= µd + adσ
2/2− s1µd −
ads
2
1σ
2
2
+ s1µp −
aps
2
1σ
2
2
.
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= µd + adσ
2/2 + s1(µp − µd)−
(ap + ad)s
2
1σ
2
2
and, using (7) and (8), this becomes
µd + adσ
2/2 +B∗()
where B∗() is defined in (8). So when the plaintiff has all of the bargaining
power, the plaintiff can extract the defendant’s maximum subjective willingness
to pay plus the entire joint value of inside contracting.
Weighting the plaintiff’s payoffs by pi and by 1 − pi, we have the plaintiff’s
subjective value of the inside contract:
pi
(
µp −
apσ
2
2
)
+ (1− pi)
(
µd +
adσ
2
2
+B∗()
)
.
This expression is decreasing in pi. The plaintiff is subjectively worse off when the
defendant’s bargaining power increases. When pi = pi the plaintiff’s subjective
payoff from the inside contract is(
adµp + apµd
ap + ad
)
+
(
ad
ap + ad
)
B∗() = µ̂0 +
(
ad
ap + ad
)
B∗().
Now consider the plaintiff’s subjective payoff from the outside contract. Using
(12), the plaintiff’s subjective value from the outside contract may be written as
(1− t1)µ0 + t1µp −
apt
2
1σ
2
2
= µ0 +
(µp − µ0)2
2apσ2
.
This is increasing in µ0 for µ0 > µp − apσ2. When µ0 = µ̂0 defined in (18) this
becomes
µ̂0 +
(µp − µ̂0)2
2apσ2
= µ̂0 +
(µp − adµp+apµdap+ad )2
2apσ2
= µ̂0 +
(
ad
ap + ad
)
(µp − µd)2
2(ap + ad)σ2
= µ̂0 +
(
ad
ap + ad
)
B∗().
Therefore the plaintiff’s subjective payoff from the inside and the outside contract
are exactly the same when pi = pi and µ0 = µ̂0.
Similarly, the defendant’s subjective payment with inside contracting is
pi
(
µp −
apσ
2
2
−B∗()
)
+ (1− pi)
(
µd +
adσ
2
2
)
.
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This is an increasing function of pi, so the defendant is better off when his own
bargaining power is stronger. When pi = pi, one can show as above that the
defendant’s subjective payment with the inside contract is
µ̂0 −
(
ap
ap + ad
)
B∗().
Now we construct the defendant’s subjective payment from he outside contract.
Using (13), the defendant’s payment is
(1− r1)µ0 + r1µp +
adr
2
1σ
2
2
= µ0 −
(µ0 − µd)2
2adσ2
.
this is increasing in µ0 when µ0 < µd + adσ
2. When µ0 = µ̂0 then the defendant’s
subjective payment from the outside contract
µ̂0 −
(
ap
ap + ad
)
B∗().
When pi = pi, this equals the defendant’s payment with the inside contract. 
Proof of Equation (23): Substituting the expressions for t1 and r1 from (12)
and (13) into (16) gives
R0(µ0, µp, µd, ap, ad, σ
2) =
σ2
2
(
ap(µp − µ0)2
a2pσ
4
+
ad(µ0 − µd)2
a2dσ
4
)
=
1
2σ2
(
(µp − µ0)2
ap
+
(µ0 − µd)2
ad
)
Expanding and rearranging terms verifies that this is equivalent to
R0() = 1
2σ2
(
ap + ad
apad
)[
µ0 −
(
adµp + apµd
ap + ad
)]2
+
(µp + µd)
2
2(ap + ad)σ2
.
Using the definitions of µ̂0 in (18) and R
∗() in (9), this becomes
R0() = 1
2σ2
(
ap + ad
apad
)
(µ0 − µ̂0)2 +R∗(). 
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Figure 1: Inside and Outside Contracts (µd < µp)
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